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In this article I respond to Rebecca Stangl’s criticism of Jonathan Dancy’s outline for a particularist account of 
moral principles which identifies a number of important problems that call for a response from particularists. 
In order to give such a response I develop a novel particularist account of moral principles that avoids the 
problems in question. By clarifying the distinction between articulating a principle and examining its truth I 
explain, pace Stangl, how moral principles can be derived from imaginary or actual individual cases, how 
principles derived from particular cases can create general moral presumptions, how such principles can be 
justified, and what the truth of moral principles consists in. I conclude with a discussion of the employment of 
principles to justify moral judgments, and explain how the proposed account of moral principles avoids a 
problem concerning moral responsibility that arises for generalist accounts of the justificatory use of 
principles, such as Stangl assumes, according to which a principle ought to show the actual moral relevance of 
a property in a given case. Overall my aim is to articulate, by answering six puzzles that Dancy has raised for 
moral philosophy, an alternative to the traditional generalist picture of the role and significance of moral 
principles in/for moral thought. 
 
1. Particularism and Dancy’s account of moral principles 
 
A central issue in the debate between particularists and generalists is whether principles must play a role in 
philosophical explanations of morality.1 Whilst modern moral philosophy has historically tended to assume a 
generalist position, this has been challenged by particularists. As Jonathan Dancy writes in an oft-quoted 
passage: “[…] morality has no need for principles at all. Moral thought, moral judgment, and the possibility of 
moral distinctions—none of these depends in any way on the provision of a suitable supply of moral 
principles” (Dancy, 2004, 5, cf. 73). According to Dancy, our grasp of moral situations doesn’t have to be 
explained as based on or involving moral principles, either as something tacitly assumed or explicitly relied 
upon, and moral deliberation need not be analysed in terms of such principles. Neither are principles required 
to explain the possibility of moral value. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that a particularist couldn’t 
recognize that principles play a role in moral thought. This is unproblematic as long as principles are not 
necessary for morality, and the account of their function is consistent with the commitments of particularism. 
Dancy writes: 
 
It seems wise for particularism to allow some role for moral principles, somehow conceived, rather 
than simply announce that everyone is completely mistaken about them and their importance for 
ethical thought and education. […] So particularism needs to provide some account, within the 
constraints which it accepts, of what is a very common practice of somehow appealing to general 
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truths and previous cases in the course of reaching moral judgment, and in the justification of one 
when reached (Dancy 1993, 67). 
 
Although this doesn’t yet tell us much about Dancy’s view of moral principles, it reveals that he regards 
principles as expressing general truths. More specifically, Dancy contrasts such general truths with what he 
calls “substantial principles” which he regards as incompatible with particularism. Characteristic of such 
substantial principles is that they hold without exception about the right- or wrong-making properties they 
concern. Thus conceived, a property would count invariantly in favour or against the rightness or wrongness 
of an action possessing that property, even though the reason that the property constitutes for regarding the 
action right/wrong might sometimes be disabled or defeated by some other considerations that recognize the 
presence of other morally relevant properties. Still, the property would always point in the same direction or 
have the same moral valence as right/wrong-making, and this is what a substantial principle would identify.2 
As Dancy characterizes such principles, “the properties that feature in them play the same role on every new 
appearance” (Dancy 1993, 66). Ethics without Principles refers to this kind of account of the behaviour of 
moral reasons as “the kitchen scale model” (Dancy 2004, 10). 
Rather than taking principles to show how things are always or invariantly, Dancy ascribes to them a 
different modal role. “The suggestion I want to make is that a moral principle amounts to a reminder of the 
sort of importance that a property can have in suitable circumstances.” (Dancy 1993, 67; original italics) This 
view, he claims, can make “good sense of a number of puzzles in moral philosophy”, including 1) the problem 
of how the possession of principles puts a person “at advantage when coming to a decision in a particular 
case” (ibid.). Dancy’s proposal in this regard is that a principle functions as a “sort of checklist” that can be 
used to ensure that one doesn’t miss a property relevant for a moral decision or judgment (ibid.). As he 
explains, principles thus understood “create order” into “what would otherwise be a bewilderingly random list 
of properties which can matter in suitable circumstances”. This principles achieve by indicating that some 
properties are generally, though not always, “more ‘central’ than others” along with an in principle limitless 
number of potentially relevant features (Dancy 1993, 67-68). Moreover, 2) this account of principles is also 
intended to explain the use of principles to justify moral judgments. As Dancy explains, to cite a principle 
such as “it is important to be honest” constitutes an appeal to the importance of honesty in the particular case 
at hand. If correct – for example, if there is nothing more important, incompatible with honesty, to be 
considered in the circumstances – such an appeal can justify a decision such as that the honest line of action is 
the right one (Dancy 1993, 68). 
Further, Dancy argues that 3) his account can explain what he describes as “the main question in 
moral epistemology”, namely, “how knowledge of a moral principle can be derived from what we can see in a 
particular case” (Dancy 1993, 68). This is then also intended to explain, 4) how particular cases can “function 
as some sort of test for moral principles”, given that on this account principles are not fixed independently of 
particular cases and therefore are “not immune to the behaviour of particular cases” (ibid.). Relatedly, he 
holds that his account of principles gives us 5) “at least part of the answer” or “some understanding of the 
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appeal to imaginary cases to help to decide what to do about a case before us” (Dancy 1993, 68-69). The 
problem here is how to explain the possibility of our being able to “transport” a decision from such a case “to 
the actual case”, given that if an imaginary case is to serve its purpose, it needs to be free of the complexities 
and problems with the actual case (ibid.). Or as he also puts the problem: “How can an imaginary case help, if 
essentially we have to make up our minds about the moral make-up of the actual case before we can come to a 
view about whether the imaginary case is after all a reliable guide?” (Dancy 1993, 69) For example, in order 
to take guidance from an imaginary case we need to know that it doesn’t simplify misleadingly, but this seems 
to already require comprehending what is relevant in the actual case. Dancy’s response is, briefly, that part of 
the function of the imaginary case is to make it easier to see the relevance of the feature in question. “An 
imaginary case might be an abbreviated sketch of a situation where a property can be seen to be important: 
where the importance it can have is revealed” (Dancy 1993, 69). 
Finally, Dancy’s account is intended to explain 6) “the idea that moral principles, if true, are 
necessarily true” (ibid.), a point which he needs to explain independently of, and wishes to contrast with, 
generalist explanations of necessity that take truth in one case to imply truth in all other relevantly similar 
cases. As he explains: “Everybody here faces the same difficulty, that of showing both how the truth of a 
moral principle can be discerned in a particular case, and how what we are there discovering is a necessary 
truth” (Dancy 1993, 70). His own answer is derived from his account of moral principles as showing what 
relevance a feature can have. “What we are observing here is already modal, and if our observation is correct, 
there cannot be a situation in which our property could not have that importance if the circumstances were 
suitable. Hence what we observe, if true, is necessarily true” (Dancy 1993, 70; original italics).3 However, as 
Dancy emphasizes, the last point must be distinguished from the claim that the property must always have a 
certain moral importance in particular kinds of circumstances which an exceptionless generalist principle 
would specify in advance of moral agents encountering them. 
Now, although the critics of particularism have portrayed it as assuming a negative attitude towards 
moral principles – for example, according to McKeever and Ridge, “all particularist positions can be 
characterized by a negative attitude towards moral principles” (McKeever and Ridge 2005, 84; cf. 2009, 5, 14, 
178ff.) – the preceding shows that the truth is more nuanced. Particularism only adopts a negative attitude 
towards failure to recognize the complexity of moral considerations, and towards misleading simplifications 
in terms of principles. But so should all moral philosophical theories. Moreover, although particularism 
doesn’t regard principles as metaphysically or conceptually necessary for morality, it can recognize their 
practical significance for moral thought. Accordingly, it need not promote “principle abstinence”, the view 
that we should not rely on principles as guides because they offer poor guidance, a reservation associated with 
particularism by McKeever and Ridge (2009, 17ff.), and Väyrynen (2008, 75-76). Ultimately, as I explain, the 
key difference is merely that particularism explains the modal role of moral principles differently from 
generalism. Far from making it unable to explain how principles can be advantageously employed in moral 
thought, however, this enables particularism to avoid a problem about moral responsibility that seems to arise 
on a different account of the modal role of principles which Stangl relies on, and according to which a 
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principle ought to show the actual relevance of a property in a case to be judged. In order to bring relevant 
issues more sharply into focus, let’s turn to Stangl’s criticisms of Dancy. 
 
2. Stangl’s criticism of Dancy’s account of moral principles 
 
Stangl (2006) has put forward detailed criticisms of Dancy’s account of moral principles, or of his “radical 
particularist thesis” “that there are no substantive moral principles, though there may be some kind of moral 
generalizations” (Stangl 2006, 203).4 These criticisms bring to view certain important difficulties faced by his 
account that question its capacity to resolve the aforementioned puzzles 1-6. Thus, it is helpful to look at 
Stangl’s criticisms in some detail in order to see how a particularist can avoid and address the difficulties that 
she raises for Dancy. 
 To give a brief overview, Stangl discusses two interpretations of Dancy’s account of moral principles 
which she describes as “a heuristic model of moral principles” (Stangl 2006, 208), and a third account, a 
possible alternative to the second interpretation drawing on Margaret Little’s account of moral principles, “the 
default view of moral principles”. On the first interpretation Dancy’s view that principles show the relevance 
that a property can have is construed as a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This view, 
Stangl argues, can’t explain our “ordinary practice” of using moral principles, in particular their justificatory 
function (Dancy’s puzzles 1-2). It also fails to explain how a principle can be derived from and tested against 
a particular case, as well as to make sense of the role of imaginary cases (Dancy’s puzzles 3-6). On the second 
interpretation, Dancy makes a weaker claim that only states something necessary. Whilst this avoids certain 
problems with the first interpretation, it achieves this by stating something trivial. Thus, Stangl argues, 
Dancy’s account faces a dilemma of falsity vs. triviality (Stangl 2006, 214). This leads her to consider Little’s 
account. But this modification of Dancy’s view seems similarly unable to solve relevant puzzles. Let’s briefly 
look at each point. 
On the stronger interpretation there is a moral principle for every property that can be morally 
relevant. However, because almost any property can have relevance in suitable circumstances, and because 
Dancy’s account offers no basis for distinguishing between more and less important or fundamental 
principles, this leads to a limitless multiplication of principles. Stangl considers as an example the relation 
between the principles “bravery is good” and “folding one’s hands on top of each other three times in an hour 
is good”, assuming that doing the latter can in suitable circumstances constitute a brave act. Dancy’s account, 
however, can’t distinguish between properties that have moral relevance on their own (for example, bravery) 
and properties whose moral relevance depends on something else (like folding hands). Consequently, although 
such a multiplication of principles might not be “logically absurd”, this problematizes Dancy’s explanation of 
our “ordinary practices” of using moral principles for guidance, as there would be too many of them (Stangl 
2006, 209-210). “In making a decision there is something to be said for simplicity. For this reason, a person 
with such Dancian generalities, it seems to me, would be at a disadvantage in coming to moral judgment in a 
particular case” (Stangl 2006, 210). 
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Moreover, since to show that a principle can be relevant is not the same as showing that it is actually 
relevant in a given case, Dancy’s account of the use of principles to justify judgments seems problematic too 
(Stangl 2006, 210). That a property can have a certain valence in particular circumstances, “might give us 
very little reason to suppose that it actually has that valence in the case at hand” (ibid.). Similarly, Stangl 
argues that Dancy’s imaginary cases are “epistemically irrelevant” because such a case ought to give reasons 
to think that a relevant property actually has a certain valence in a given case (Stangl 2006, 211). Since Dancy 
only speaks of possible relevance, Stangl takes him unable to explain this. “Contrary to what Dancy says, 
then, his model doesn’t seem to account for the central role such principles play in reaching and justifying 
particular moral judgments” (Stangl 2006, 211). 
For related reasons Stangl remains unconvinced by Dancy’s account of how particular cases could 
function as a test for moral principles. According to her, insofar as a principle only says that a property can 
have a certain moral relevance, all that is needed to establish the principle is a single case where the property 
has this relevance. But this makes Dancy’s principles immune to rejection, except in a very weak sense. If we 
only need to produce one case as a test, all other cases where the property doesn’t have the same moral 
relevance turn out to be irrelevant for testing a principle. Hence, “[…] Dancy’s moral principles are actually 
immune to refutation by particular cases, except in an extraordinarily weak sense” (Stangl 2006, 213). 
 By contrast, the weaker interpretation maintains, not that there is a moral principle for each potentially 
relevant property, but that there is a potentially morally relevant property for each principle. This releases 
Dancy from the problem of limitless multiplication of principles. Principles such as the one regarding folding 
hands can now be admitted, but this isn’t merely because of the potential moral relevance of the action (Stangl 
2006, 213-214). A different problem arises here, however. If not all potentially relevant properties determine 
principles, which ones do? Trivially, true principles must pick out morally relevant properties. However, if 
this is all the account tells us, we seem to have only replaced a false account with a trivially true one. This 
gives rise to a dilemma: “if we read his account of moral principles as providing necessary and sufficient 
conditions, it seems obviously false. If we read it as providing only necessary, and not sufficient, conditions, 
then it is true but only trivially so” (Stagl 2006, 214). 
Moreover, the weak interpretation inherits some problems of the stronger one. The problem seems to 
persist that principles concerning potentially morally relevant properties can’t show the actual relevance of a 
moral property in a particular case. Thus, the weaker version doesn’t seem able explain the use of principles to 
justify moral judgments either. The questions regarding the role of imaginary cases, and testing principles 
against particular cases remain unanswered too. Since only one case is needed to establish potential moral 
relevance, and imaginary cases can’t show the actual relevance of a moral property, principles remain immune 
to refutation with reference to particular cases, except in a very weak sense (Stangl 2006, 214). Stangl 
concludes: “The lesson, I think, is that moral generalities can’t be mere reminders of the sort of relevance that 
a property may have. In order to generate a meaningful theoretical account of moral generalities, we need to 
specify some further property that moral generalities pick out beside the possibility of moral relevance” 
(Stangl 2006, 215). 
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Candidates for such a further property include being normally, usually or often morally relevant. Or 
more generally, “What the particularist needs, it seems, is something stronger than mere possibility of moral 
relevance but weaker than a guarantee of moral relevance” (Stangl 2006, 215). As Stangl observes, something 
like this can be found in Dancy, namely his view of default reasons that possess a certain default moral 
relevance (for example, that killing innocents is wrong) and properties referred to by thick moral concepts that 
also possess default moral valence (Stangl 2006, 215-217; Dancy 1993, 227-230 and 2004, 112-116). This 
allows one to regard bravery, but not folding hands, as possessing default moral relevance. More generally, 
particularist moral generalities would now “direct us to properties that are likely to have a certain moral 
relevance” or “are presumptive of a certain kind of moral relevance” (Stangl 2006, 215, 218). Thus, the 
default view releases us from treating almost anything as having moral relevance, but gives us more than the 
triviality of the weaker interpretation. 
Nevertheless, worries arise about the acquisition of principles. Default status can’t be established with 
reference to a particular case, since it involves a claim about a property possessing general moral relevance. 
Moreover, Dancy must reject the possibility of codifying defeaters for a default reason on pain of the collapse 
of particularism into generalism, since the possibility of codifying defeaters implies the possibility of 
invariance of moral relevance. Hence, although a generalist might try to use the invariance of moral reasons to 
explain the derivation of principles from particular cases, this move is not available to Dancy. “[…] to be a 
default reason is not to be an invariant reason” (Dancy 2004, 113; Stangl 2006, 217-219). 
This leads Stangl to Little’s account of presumptive moral principles that connect the moral with the 
non-moral, and inform us when the presence of non-moral property indicates a moral one. While not being 
law-like generalizations, such presumptive principles would nevertheless constitute “sufficiently robust 
patterns” so as to offer reliable guidance to agents with a skill to recognize when such a pattern is robust 
enough. Accordingly, it seems that such “moral generalities” could play a role in moral justification (Little 
2000; Stangl 2006, 220-222). Here the details or subsequent developments of Little’s account need not 
concern us, but we can focus on how Stangl explains it: “Mature moral agents have experienced many 
particular moral situations, about many of which they have come to form justified moral judgments. From this 
base the mature moral agent can make an inductive inference and conclude that, most of the time, certain non-
moral properties are presumptive of certain moral judgments” (Stangl 2006, 220; cf. 223). For example, we 
rarely encounter non-cruel instances of stabbing, and this may warrant a presumptive principle regarding its 
cruelty. However, this won’t guarantee its cruelty in every possible case, and if defeaters are not codifiable, 
the principle won’t be invariant (Stangl 2006, 220-221). Could this solve the problem about the derivation of 
principles for Dancy? 
No, because Little’s account is not compatible with Dancy’s view that a principle can be acquired 
from a single instance. This Stangl considers important to preserve, agreeing with Dancy that there are cases 
where an actual or imaginary single instance suffices to establish the wrongness of something. For example, 
one actual example of bullying might do so, changing one’s view about more innocent looking cases that 
might otherwise be considered as harmless with positive toughening effects. Similarly, literature or imaginary 
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examples might show us something general about a case at hand, and justify the adoption of a moral principle 
(Stangl 2006, 220, 223-226). “The judgment about the imaginary case creates a presumption about relevantly 
similar cases” (Stangl 2006, 226). 
More specifically, Stangl raises the problem that, even though Dancy can accept defeasible 
presumptive principles, they couldn’t be derived from particular cases unless there is “something about the 
property itself that is general, which we are able to observe here and now” (Stangl 2006, 224). However, 
Dancy’s particularism about the relevance of moral properties and reason-holism5 don’t allow him to accept 
that a single instance could give us an insight into the behaviour of a property more generally. Yet, he can’t 
accept principles based on inductive generalization either, without giving up on the view that a principle can 
be derived from a single case. Hence, Dancy seems unable to explain the possibility of deriving, from either 
particular actual cases or imaginary cases, moral insights regarding the presumptive default moral valence of 
properties or default reasons expressible in principles (Stangl 2006, 226-227). 
 Stangl concludes: “A solution to this problem [of how a principle can be acquired from single or an 
imaginary case], I take it, would go a long way towards articulating a plausible radical particularist account of 
the role general truths play in the structure of our moral knowledge” (Stangl 2006, 228; my square brackets). 
In the remainder of this article I introduce a particularist account of moral principles intended to solve this 
problem, to avoid the problems raised by Stangl, and to answer Dancy’s puzzles 1-6. 
 
3. A particularist response to Stangl 
  
The first step towards solving the problems Stangl raises is to distinguish, or to emphasize the distinction, 
between a) articulating a moral principle with reference to a particular case, and b) examining or establishing 
the truth of a principle. That two logically distinct steps are involved in acquiring a true moral principle is 
evident in that it is not possible to adopt a principle without it having been articulated (one would then not 
know which principle one is adopting), and that it is possible to articulate false principles or suspend judgment 
on the truth of moral principles, whilst acknowledging them as possible ones. Although Stangl implicitly 
acknowledges that there is such a distinction, since the very possibility of raising questions about the truth of 
principles presupposes the possibility of false principles or principles the truth-value of which is unclear, she 
obscures the distinction in her criticism. This problem comes to view in the assumption, which her criticism 
depends on, that the only basis to examine the truth of principles is the same cases from which they were 
derived. This creates the impression that as soon as a principle has been articulated with reference to a 
particular case, it will already also have been established as true. In other words, the case from which the 
principle was derived seems to automatically establish the principle as true, because Stangl assumes that the 
truth of principles is established with reference to the very same cases from which they were derived. A 
limitless multiplication of principles seems to follow (on the strong interpretation of Dancy). But this is only 
due to Stangl’s exclusion of other cases from consideration. A particularist who wants to explain the 
derivation of principles from a particular actual or imaginary case only needs to regard principles as 
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articulated with reference to particular cases, and need not accept Stangl’s assumption that runs together steps 
a) and b). 
How one might come to lose sight of the distinction between a) and b) seems understandable enough. 
Normally we are not interested in articulating false principles. When articulating a principle we keep an eye 
on its truth and, so to speak, take the two steps at once. (This is analogous with articulating a theory and 
putting it forward as true. While articulating a theory is evidently distinct from establishing its truth, the goal 
of articulating a true theory informs theory construction.) Nevertheless, a principle such as “actions done on a 
Tuesday are wrong” is a possible moral principle. Cases where it says something true can be constructed, even 
though they are unusual. Thus, judgments in accordance with the principle will generally be false, which gives 
a reason to reject the principle as false. (I return to the truth of principles shortly.) However, the possibility of 
the Tuesday-principle brings to view yet again that the steps of a) articulating a principle and b) establishing 
or examining its truth are logically distinct, and that acquiring a true principle is logically a two-step process. 
With a view to developing an account of principles that avoids Stangl’s criticism, let me start from step a). 
 If we consider what deriving a principle from a particular case involves, an important component is 
what might be described as abstraction. By abstraction I mean isolating a specific feature or features from the 
other features of a case, which then allows a moral agent to focus their attention on this/these feature/features. 
Abstraction in this sense is a familiar phenomenon. For example, it allows moral agents to compare particular 
cases with regard to their specific features, such as the feature that an action involves stealing. Consequently, 
abstraction enables agents to compare cases that might otherwise be quite different and share no other 
features, as might be with instances of violent robbery and white collar theft. Similarly to how it plays a role 
in comparing cases, abstraction can also provide the basis for moral principles in that, once a property has 
been abstracted from a case, it is also possible to articulate a principle that features it. But although abstraction 
may therefore be regarded as important for articulating principles, the latter involves more than comparing 
particular cases. 
There may be important similarities between using a particular case as an aid in judging another case, 
and using a principle to judge a case. Nevertheless, a principle involves no reference to any particular case or 
cases by contrast to comparing cases directly. For example, “lying is wrong” doesn’t speak of any particular 
instances. By its form the principle is universal or exceptionless, applying to any or all cases of lying (unless 
qualifications are added). In order to address the problems raised by Stangl about the derivation of principles 
from particular cases, I therefore need to explain how the transition is made from considerations relating to a 
particular case to considerations relating to all or many cases. 
The proposed account is metaphysically light. The absence of reference to any particular cases of 
stealing need not be interpreted as meaning that, instead of speaking about particular instances, the principle 
speaks about some metaphysical abstract property or entity, such as a law that connects the feature of stealing 
with wrongness in every possible instance of stealing or with certain qualifications. Rather, when articulating 
a principle we simply cancel references to any particular cases, whereby the principle acquires an 
exceptionless or universal character. We can speak here of non-temporal and non-spatial use of principles, as 
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when one cites a principle without it being applied to any particular case, and speaks abstractly about lying 
and its wrongness. Relatedly, the derivation of a principle from a case or cases can be described as involving 
non-temporalization and non-spatialization, that is, cancelling references to particular cases, considered either 
individually or generalized over. Here the notion of non-temporal/non-spatial use spares us from postulating 
any metaphysical properties or regularities as what the principle speaks about. Pace Stangl, no such postulates 
are needed on the proposed account to explain how an individual or imaginary case can give a moral agent a 
general or default moral presumption.6 (I return to this shortly. How formally exceptionless principles are re-
connected with actual cases is explained in section 5.) 
To bring this account of step a) to bear on the problems raised by Stangl, if principles are derived 
from particular cases through abstraction and non-temporalization/non-spatialization, there is no difficulty 
about how imaginary or actual particular cases can serve as the basis of principles. For on the proposed 
account, examining the truth of principles is distinguished from their articulation. This makes it possible to 
solve the problems raised by Stangl about how imaginary cases can help to judge actual cases, how an 
individual actual case can help to judge other cases, and how an imaginary case or an individual actual case 
can create a general moral presumption. I outline this shortly, but the basic point is simple. The possibility of 
using a principle to justify a moral judgment depends on the principle’s truth. The truth of a principle, 
however, is not tested with reference to anything imaginary or on the basis of considerations that only apply to 
some single individual case. Hence, there is no reason to think, for instance, that imaginary cases might 
somehow serve as input for inductive generalizations (pace Stangl 2006, 225). 
More specifically, the point that the truth of a principle is not established with reference to a particular 
actual case, or an imaginary case, makes it possible to respond to Stangl’s key criticism of Dancy that a 
particularist can’t explain what it is to examine the truth of a principle, except in a very weak sense that makes 
particularist principles immune to falsification. Crucially, however, this problem arises only, if we ignore the 
distinction between a) of articulating a principle and b) of examining its truth. All that is really required to 
explain the derivation of a moral principle from particular actual or imaginary case is an account such as the 
preceding that explains the derivation of a principle through abstraction and non-temporalization/non-
spatialization. Consequently, Stangl’s assumption that the only basis for examining the truth of a principle is 
the very same case from which the principle was derived can be rejected, and replaced by a different account 
of what it is to examine or establish the truth of a principle. Let’s turn to this. 
Having rejected Stangl’s problematic assumption, a natural alternative is to see testing principles as 
requiring their examination in light of many cases or in light of considerations that have bearing on many 
cases. This corresponds to the idea that moral principles have general applicability. Thus, whilst a moral 
judgment is true if things are as it says in the case or cases it concerns, the truth of a principle is general and 
open-ended. Although neither Dancy nor Stangl explains in any detail what is to be understood by the truth of 
principles, this presumption of the generality of their truth is indicated by Dancy’s characterization of moral 
principles as expressing general truths (Dancy 1993, 67; see section 1). Similarly, Stangl notes: “[…] most of 
us probably think there is a general moral principle to the effect that lying is wrong. Few of us, however, think 
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that there is an absolute constraint on lying” (Stangl 2006, 217). By “absolute” she means exceptionless, and 
by there being a principle that lying is wrong I presume her to mean that she accepts this principle as true. In 
line with this, what it is for a moral principle to be true can be explained by saying that a principle is true 
insofar as moral judgments regarding particular cases that accord with the principle would be true. For 
example, we can say that the principle “Lying is wrong” is true, insofar as it is or would be correct to judge 
instances of lying to be wrong by virtue of their being lies. (Of course, the truth of a principle doesn’t depend 
on anyone actually making any judgments about relevant cases.) The principle “Lying is wrong” is therefore 
made true by the cases in which lying is wrong, i.e. would be correctly judged to be so. Similarly, the 
generality of a principle depends on whether judgments regarding particular cases in accordance with the 
principle would be generally true. Accordingly, the truth expressed by the principle about lying is general, 
whilst the preceding Tuesday-principle is not. This leaves it vague how general the truth of a principle must be 
in order for a principle to count as true, but this is not problematic as such. In any case, since Stangl is willing 
to tolerate this vagueness, as shown by her recognition of the principle about lying as true even though it is not 
exceptionless, I shall accept it too. Exceptions to a principle then are cases where corresponding moral 
judgments wouldn’t be true. 
This suggestion about the truth of principles doesn’t mean that their truth would be established 
through an inductive generalization over particular cases. Although, it may be important to consider a variety 
of cases, the purpose need not be collecting data against/for something, as if making an inductive 
generalization. Here it is important that, even if counting instances where lying is wrong as opposed to right or 
neutral might support a presumption that lying is mostly wrong, such generalizations tell us neither which 
cases of lying are wrong, nor why lying is wrong in those cases. Accordingly, the point of considering 
different cases, when trying to establish the truth of a principle, lies elsewhere. In short, considering different 
cases can help one to achieve a better understanding of what doing so and so morally amounts to, and why 
doing it is right/wrong. For example, seeing what is common to cases where lying is wrong (or common to 
many of them) can put one in a position to justify the truth of the principle about lying in general terms. One 
might point out with Kant, for example, that lying compromises the ability of agents to set and pursue their 
goals, because it misleads them about how things are and what their options are. Lying therefore is 
disrespectful of their autonomy. This is to clarify what doing so and so amounts to with the purpose of 
explaining why it is wrong. Consistently with particularism, however, such justifications can be context-
sensitive. For instance, immoral goals need not be respected. Lying therefore isn’t wrong in such cases, or it 
might even be right. On other occasions lying might constitute a genuine harm, but this harm might be 
eclipsed by some greater harm resulting from not lying, and so on. 
This account of establishing or examining the truth of principles can also explain how a single case 
can make one realize the truth of a principle, as in Stangl’s example of bullying, where a single example 
makes an agent change their view about its wrongness (Stangl 2006, 227). One may be brought to such a 
realization by an example that clearly reveals what bullying amounts to (or more generally, what doing so and 
so really amounts to), while a complicated and unperspicuous case is unlikely to have this effect. 
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Consequently, it may be unnecessary to consider other cases. In this way a single case can change one’s view 
about doing so and so in general, so that one comes to regard the principle against it as true, and the fact that 
an action would constitute doing so and so emerges as a general presumption or default reason against it. (For 
Dancy’s notion of default reason, see Dancy 2004, 112-113.) More precisely, on the proposed account, the 
default moral status of a property depends on whether what a principle says about that property is generally 
true about relevant cases, for example, whether instances of lying are generally (as opposed to rarely) wrong. 
In this sense a principle with a default status reveals more than what moral importance a property can have. 
Thus, we can also agree with Stangl that default status depends on the likely moral importance of the property, 
taking this to be a function of how generally or rarely the property is right/wrong-making (Stangl 2006, 215). 
However, on the proposed account there is no need to think that individual cases would possess some peculiar 
property that by itself creates a general moral presumption (pace Stangl 2006, 224). 
It is noteworthy that this account of examining the truth of principles is consistent with Dancy’s 
account of the possibility of invariant reasons, i.e. that something might always be a reason for/against doing 
something, without this compromising his holism about reasons. According to Dancy, “Invariant reasons, 
should there be any, will be invariant not because they are reasons but because of their specific content. And 
this is something that the particularist, it seems, should admit” (Dancy 2000, 136; cf. 2004, 77). In other 
words, insofar as feature X is always a reason against, this has to do with what X is. For example, that an 
action constitutes a murder might always be a reason against doing it, and this is so because of the kind of 
action murder is. Hence, one can justify the truth of the principle that murder is wrong by clarifying what kind 
of action murder is, similarly to the preceding explanation about lying, except that in the case of murder there 
might be no contextual considerations (at least not realistic ones; see below) that affect its value. 
It should be noted that these considerations about establishing the truth of a principle can be regarded 
as merely illustrative as far as concerns the argument in this section. (I will make further use of them in the 
following section.) The important point is that, pace Stangl, a particularist need not maintain that the truth of a 
principle depends on the same case with reference to which a principle was articulated. Given the distinction 
between step of a) articulating a principle and b) examining its truth, other ways of establishing the truth of 
principles are available to particularists. Thus, because Stangl’s criticism relies on an assumption that 
particularists can reject, it is no obstacle to a particularist account of moral principles. 
My account of particularist principles also provides an answer to another problem Stangl raises for 
Dancy. Not all potentially relevant properties determine true moral principles, but only those that correspond 
to generally correct moral judgments. Hence, both the problem of the multiplication of possible principles (on 
Stangl’s strong interpretation of Dancy) and Dancy’s apparent failure to explain which potentially relevant 
properties determine principles (on the weak interpretation) have been solved. It is also an advantage that the 
proposed account can explain what it is to establish the truth of a principle in cases where it is derived from a 
single actual or imaginary case, and where a single case creates a general moral presumption (Stangl 2006, 
224). Thus, I have answered Dancy’s “main question in moral epistemology” of “how knowledge of a moral 




4. The use of principles in moral thought and their advantages 
 
The preceding section outlines answers to puzzles 3-5 from Dancy: 3) How knowledge of a principle can be 
derived from a particular case; 4) How particular cases can function as a test for moral principles; 5) How 
imaginary cases can help to judge actual cases. I conclude by explaining how the proposed account helps to 
deal with the rest of Dancy’s puzzles: 1) How principles are advantageous for making moral decisions; 2) 
How principles can be used to justify moral decisions (section 5); 6) How moral principles can be understood 
as saying something true a priori or necessarily. As my proposed answer to the last question is implicit in the 
last few paragraphs, I start from that. 
According to Dancy, “a moral principle amounts to a reminder of the sort of importance that a 
property can have in suitable circumstances” (Dancy 1993, 67). This formulation seems problematic in that, 
whilst I agree that the role of a moral principle is to remind a moral agent about the importance a property can 
have (see below), the words “in suitable circumstances” seem to add something wrong. When the 
circumstances are specified in relevant respects, the moral value of the property in its circumstances is also 
determined7 – as a far as it can be. Perhaps indeterminacy and reasonable disagreement in judgments can’t be 
excluded (see example below).8 Indeed, Dancy’s formulation seems to be in tension with what he says about 
necessity a few pages later: “What we are observing here is already modal, and if our observation is correct, 
there cannot be a situation in which our property could not have that importance if the circumstances were 
suitable. Hence what we observe, if true, is necessarily true” (Dancy 1993, 70; but see note 3 for Dancy’s 
modification of his view). The latter point agrees with the explanation in the preceding section, according to 
which the moral value of doing so and so depends on what kind of action doing so and so constitutes in 
specific circumstances. For instance, given its circumstances, there may be no option but to judge a certain 
action of lying to be wrong. This will be so if, for example, the lie is designed to ruin the reputation of 
someone who is not guilty of what the lie claims, and who has never been anything but good towards the liar 
and others. If these are the relevant features of the action in its circumstances, the lie must be judged wrong. 
Although it is contingent that an action of lying with these characteristics ever took place, its wrongness is not 
a contingent feature of the action in addition to its genuinely contingent features. Rather, its contingent 
features in the circumstances (or descriptions thereof) entail its wrongness. Thus, the judgment about the 
wrongness of the action can be justified a priori with reference to those features.9 Relatedly, although every 
instance of lying might not be wrong, wherever the principle “lying is wrong” does apply, the corresponding 
judgment is true necessarily, i.e. entailed by the features of the action. Now, because the truth of relevant 
judgments is necessary, we can also say that the corresponding principle it is true necessarily, wherever it 
holds. The principle is therefore absolute in Dancy’s (but not Stangl’s) sense, i.e. the circumstances allow for 
no other judgment. But the principle is not exceptionless unlike substantial generalist principles (cf. Dancy 
1993, 230). Herewith an answer has been sketched to puzzle 6). 
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On this basis, I propose to modify Dancy’s account of moral principles as follows: “A moral principle 
amounts to a reminder of the sort of importance that a property can have”, or “A moral principle amounts to a 
reminder of the sort of importance that a property would have in suitable circumstances.” Crucially, the latter 
formulation is consistent with particularism insofar as it is not possible to codify information into principles 
about all circumstances where they apply, so that the principles would be exceptionless. Moreover, as there 
seems to be no reason independent of generalism to believe that every situation where a principle applies 
could be determined in advance, it is up to the generalists to show that the contrary is true. Indeed, there are 
reasons to think that the understanding of moral agents about morally relevant features in circumstances is 
ultimately not specifiable in advance of their encountering those circumstances. If so, the possibility of 
exceptionless principles becomes questionable. For instance, is it wrong for me to murder my murderous 
double-ganger created by an evil scientist? Perhaps not. The point is that even though the principle “murder is 
wrong” might hold without exceptions in normal situations, this doesn’t cover every possible situation. 
Consequently, it seems impossible to determine in advance what might count as a morally relevant 
consideration so that this is settled for every possible situation. (For instance, the development of medicine 
creates new situations where previously unforeseen features of situations might become morally relevant.) If 
so, the proposed reformulation of the function of moral principles avoids collapsing into generalism.10 Let me 
therefore move on to Dancy’s puzzle 1). 
 On 1) I agree with Dancy that a main function of moral principles is to help moral agents to manage 
the complexity of situations. Principles create order, helping to narrow down the potentially morally relevant 
features of situations by indicating which features are generally/likely important, or particularly important 
even if more rare (Dancy 1993, 67-68; see quotes in section 1). Accordingly, a principle that abstracts such a 
feature or features for consideration can help a moral agent to see relevant situations in a more orderly way, 
and help them to focus on what is morally relevant in them. Moral principles can in this sense be understood 
as principles of organization that are employed by moral agents as devices of clarification with the purpose of 
helping them to judge moral situations. 
The usefulness of principles for moral agents (generally speaking) can be further clarified by 
considering how moral thought in terms of principles differs from thought informed by comparisons between 
cases. Rather than having to directly compare cases with regard to their value-determining features, a principle 
provides moral agents with a simpler instrument for judging value in targeted cases. A principle might in this 
regard be compared with a measuring rod which releases an agent from having to drag two objects next to one 
another to compare their spatial dimensions. But whilst a measuring rod constitutes a mode of representing 
objects with regard to a certain specific and easily determinable feature, moral principles constitute modes of 
representing actions (and so on) in light of a variety of value-determining features whose behaviour is much 
more complicated. Thus, the principle “lying is wrong” represents actions of lying as possessing negative 
value, or insofar as it is not exceptionless but still general, it represents lying as generally/likely wrong-
making. The principle thus singles out lying as something for moral agents to attend to, even though it doesn’t 
specify the cases in which lying is wrong. As opposed to comparisons between cases, a principle has the 
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advantage of simplicity, given that cases used as objects of comparison will possesses a variety of features 
that won’t be relevant for judging the target case. Such features make the comparison more difficult, and 
might confuse the judgment-maker. This indicates how principles help to manage complexity. They help 
agents to focus on morally important features through abstraction resulting in simplification, whereby the 
importance of simplicity is shown by how the clarificatory value of a principle decreases in proportion to an 
increase in its complexity.  (Imaginary cases, which usually are simpler than actual cases, but more complex 
than principles, stand somewhere between actual cases and principles with regard to complexity.) It is also 
important that judging a case in light of a principle makes it unnecessary for an agent to have experienced 
similar situations so as to make comparisons between them. Thus principles widen the capacity of agents to 
deal with cases beyond their experience. This may partly explain their pedagogical importance. 
Beyond serving as devices of clarification, the principles of agents partly determine their moral 
outlooks, indicating what they think is morally important and requires attention. Relatedly, when a principle is 
internalized, it can guide an agent’s actions and perception by directing their attention in specific ways. This 
means that, pace Stangl on Dancy, the significance of principles is not merely heuristic, whereby a principle 
would only offer rule of thumb kind of guidance that an experienced moral agent might not need. To the 
extent that principles are partly constitutive of the moral outlooks of moral agents, their significance is only 
partially captured by describing them as heuristic. (A particularist, of course, need not regard principles as 
necessary for moral outlooks. Besides principles, various other things, such as stories and allegories may play 
a role in determining an agent’s moral outlook.) Herewith answers have been outlined to question 1), 
regarding the advantages of principles for moral agents and decision making. 
 
5. The use of principles to justify judgments 
 
How we move from the point that principles highlight potentially morally relevant features to establishing 
what features are actually relevant in given cases is the core of question 2) about how principles help to justify 
moral judgments. A particularist, of course, need not deny that principles can be used to justify moral 
judgments, only that the justification of judgments always depends on principles. It is also clear that a correct 
moral judgment must be based on what is actually relevant for judging a case. Potential relevance therefore 
doesn’t suffice to justify a moral judgment. 
One might wish to object to the proposed account of principles as devices of clarification by saying 
that insofar as the possibility of moral value depends on there being principles, the proposed account of their 
function can’t be correct. This general objection against particularism need not be accepted, however. It is 
question-begging, and it is not necessary to understand the role of moral principles in these terms. Instead, the 
function of principles can be explained as follows. A moral principle is a general rule that such and such 
features matter morally, for example, that lying does. But that such features matter morally doesn’t depend on 
the existence of any general rule or principle. They may simply matter (to certain kinds of beings) just as, for 
example, the deadly consequences of a certain action may matter, regardless of any questions of generality. 
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(The possibility of particularism in general depends in this. Dancy makes a similar point in 1993, 105-106.) 
Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not principles that justify moral judgments. Rather, a principle indicates what 
the justification of a moral judgment depends on. For example, it is not that the utility-principle justifies an 
action with happiness maximizing consequences. It is the happiness maximizing consequences that justify the 
action, whilst the utility-principle generalizes the observation regarding the relevance of happiness 
maximizing consequences into the rule that such consequences, and only them, matter morally. 
Correspondingly, it is not any principle about the wrongness of lying that justifies the judgment that a 
particular lie is wrong. The judgment is justified by the features of the action in its circumstances, and the 
principle merely emphasizes the importance of paying attention to lying as generally/likely wrong-making, 
acting as a reminder. 
A principle that allows for exceptions, its truth being general but not universal, doesn’t tell moral 
agents to which cases it is correctly applied. Rather, applying principles correctly is the responsibility of moral 
agents. To see why this is important for the justificatory use of principles, recall, first, that principles, as I 
explained their derivation in section 3 in terms of abstraction, don’t refer to any particular cases as they stand, 
but constitute non-temporal/non-spatial statements. Accordingly, it is essential, on the proposed account, that 
principles are applied (or misapplied) to cases by moral agents. How agents do this is simple to explain: 
principles are applied to actual cases by comparing those cases with principles, and by examining the cases in 
their light. Moreover, the fact that the application of principles is the job of moral agents is important also 
because this helps to expose a problem with the often assumed account of the justificatory function of 
principles that Stangl relies on too, i.e. that a principle should show the actual moral relevance of a property in 
a case. Let’s now address this final issue. 
 On the proposed account the justificatory function of principles can’t be explained by saying that a 
principle establishes the truth of a moral judgment.11 Rather, principles help agents to identify relevant 
features on which the justification or truth of moral judgments concerning those cases depends. Thus, whilst 
principles can in this way help to justify judgments, their function is to clarify the grounds for the justification 
of moral judgments. Importantly, this excludes the possibility that a principle would guarantee what the actual 
moral valence of a property is in a particular case, and that the responsibility of agents for correct judgments 
could, consequently, be delegated to principles. Why the latter is problematic has to do with what Lars 
Hertzberg has described as moral escapism, a tendency to go along with what is generally accepted or to 
delegate moral decisions to moral experts (Hertzberg 2002)12. The problem with moral escapism is the 
following. Decisions in many areas of life can indeed be delegated to experts, for example to legal or medical 
experts, so that if the expert’s advice is wrong and things go badly, the expert may be held responsible. For 
instance, if I follow the advice of a doctor about administering medicine to my grandmother, but she dies from 
the medicine, the fault is not mine, but it might be the doctor’s. Crucially, however, this delegation of 
responsibility doesn’t seem to extend to morality. If I follow moral advice, and a disaster ensues, the 
responsibility for having followed the advice is mine. Here it is not possible to justify the faultlessness of my 
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action, and absolve me from responsibility, by saying that I followed an expert’s moral advice. The 
responsibility remains with me for having followed the advice.13 
This point about experts can be extended to moral principles in that, however rigorously a moral 
principle might seem to have been established, if I follow the principle in a particular case and make a wrong 
decision, the responsibility is mine. But if this is correct, it is morally problematic to appeal to principles 
without taking responsibility for their correct application in particular cases. Accordingly, it is problematic to 
argue, as Stangl does, that moral principles (or imaginary examples) should not merely indicate the potential 
relevance of moral properties, but their actual relevance in given cases (Stangl 2006, 201-211). This 
requirement is not consistent with the recognition of the non-delegateable responsibility of moral agents for 
their moral judgments and employment of principles. Instead, the expectation that a principle should show the 
actual relevance of a moral property seems to invite an attitude towards principles that undermines moral 
seriousness and encourages moral escapism in Hertzberg’s sense. Consequently, the account of moral 
principles that Stangl regards as desirable seems problematic not only philosophically, insofar as moral 
philosophy ought to clarify our “ordinary practice” of moral judgment-making, including moral responsibility 
and the possibility of delegating it, but morally. 
Therefore, even if generalists succeeded in developing exceptionless moral principles, their alleged 
exceptionlessness can’t release moral agents from their responsibility to judge whether a principle actually 
applies in a particular case. As the problem of escapism indicates, assurances about the exceptionlessness of 
principles are at best irrelevant in practice, if not positively misleading, because moral agents will nevertheless 
remain responsible for the application of principles and the resulting judgments. Conversely, it should not be 
counted against a particularist account of principles and moral justification that it doesn’t explain moral 
justification as dependent on and delegateable to principles. Rather, avoiding the risk of moral escapism is an 
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1 This question can be understood in a practical sense, concerning the issue whether principles are required as guides or 
standards in moral deliberation, or in a theoretical sense, concerning the question whether principles are required to 
explain the possibility of moral thought or why the objects of moral evaluation possess the value they do. Mostly my 
focus will be on the practical or epistemological side, though I will occasionally comment on relevant metaphysical or 
conceptual issues too. 
2 I discuss some qualifications to this in section 3. Dancy (more recent personal communication) says that he doesn’t 
want to allow for “particularist principles”. However, given that on the proposed account such principles come much to 
the same as Dancy’s general truths, and that such principles can be clearly distinguished from generalist ones, I don’t see  
a substantial disagreement. 
3 Dancy has revised this point, proposing that the relation between properties and the moral judgments they ground is one 
of entailment and a priori, but nevertheless contingent (Dancy 2008). As space doesn’t allow me to discuss the notion of 
contingent a priori (cf. Kripke 1981), I will side step this issue by speaking of entailment in relevant contexts (see section 
4). 
4 ‘Moral generalities’ is Stangl’s term for particularist moral principles which is intended to avoid begging questions 
against the particularists’ rejection of principles (Stangl 2006, 202, note 3). 
5 According to reason-holism, reasons are context sensitive, so that what is a reason against in some context might be a 
reason for or neutral in another context, and non-additive, so that combining to reasons for something might not add up to 
a stronger reason for but constitute a reason against (Dancy 2000, 132-133 and 2004, 73ff.). 
6 Non-temporal/non-spatial use of signs is typical in mathematics. 1+1=2 doesn’t speak of any particular individuals in 
that its validity is not limited to counting certain two apples, for example. It is also noteworthy that non-




generalizing over cases, the former cancels any references to cases. An imaginary case, if it is abstractly enough 
described might already be non-temporal/non-spatial in the relevant sense. 
7 It would seem better for Dancy to use “would” instead of “can” in formulating his point. 
8 Reasonable disagreements may relate to what features of an action are relevant for judging it, although ignorance of 
relevant features can also lead to misjudgements. 
9 The situation is analogous to this: given the rules of chess, a certain move can’t but count as checkmate. This is 
consistent with the fact that given some other arrangement of chess pieces on the board, exactly the same move wouldn’t 
count as a checkmate. Similarly, the moral value of the same lie might be different in other circumstances. The negative 
analogy here is that whilst it is possible to calculate all possible circumstances for a certain move to count as checkmate, 
the possible circumstances of human life and what might be morally relevant in them don’t seem calculable (see below). 
10 Here we come to another discussion about principles, i.e. whether principles with qualifications built into them could 
give generalists what they want (Crisp 2000). However, if such qualifications are added to a principle one by one, and 
there is no principled place to stop adding them, principles of this kind turn out to be indeterminate and impossible to 
complete. For hedged moral principles that have qualifications built into them as generalizations, and which seem able to 
avoid the problem just described, see McKeever and Ridge 2009 and Väyrynen 2009. However, if such hedged principles 
can’t be given specific content without relying on the comprehension of moral agents regarding the particular 
circumstances of their application, hedged principles remain empty formulae. If so, they can’t support to generalism 
either, but lead to its collapse into particularism. The discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
11 If, as explained in section 3, the reason to regard a principle as true is that it corresponds to true moral judgments, then 
the truth of principles depends on the truth of judgments, not the other way around. 
12 Related issues have been addresses in the context of discussions on moral deference, though in different, epistemic 
terms. See, for example, McGrath 2011, and Davia and Palmia 2015. 
13 This doesn’t imply that moral experts should not be consulted, only that those following them can’t delegate the 
responsibility to them. Possibly, moral responsibility might sometimes be shared by the agent and the expert. But here 
the point still holds that following someone’s advice won’t release an agent from responsibility for their judgments or 
actions. 
14 I would like to thank Jonathan Dancy and Pekka Väyrynen for comments on earlier drafts of this article, and the 
anonymous reviewers for Ethical Perspectives for their comments of the almost final version. 
